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I. INTRODUCTION 
Raising funds is a pivotal task for start-up companies.  Private 
equity1 is crucial for start-up companies, especially in the stages 
before they reach profitability.  In these stages of a corporation, 
other forms of financing, such as debt financing, are rarely 
accessible.  With neither profits nor tangible assets to serve as 
collateral, start-up companies are unable to attract creditors.2  
Private equity has been gaining recognition as entrepreneurial, 
small-scale companies have become more central to economic 
development in the United States.  Studies have shown that during 
the last two decades, small firms accounted for the majority of 
newly created jobs.3  Additionally, those small firms created the 
majority of innovations.4 
Venture capitalists (VCs) not only provide the essential private 
equity, but are also active investors of start-up companies.  VCs 
mentor and monitor the companies in which they invest.5  They 
offer assistance and support in developing the business of their 
portfolio companies.  VCs also have both the access and expertise 
needed to conduct effective monitoring. 
The distribution of equity, however, is affected by the 
requirements and restrictions imposed by the law on issuance and 
transfer of securities.  As a general rule, absent an exemption, the 
law requires companies to register the distribution of securities.  
Complying with the registration requirement is not only 
exceptionally time-consuming and costly, but also involves public 
disclosure of potentially sensitive information.  In addition, the 
 
 1. Private equity is equity that is not traded on the public markets. 
 2. See David J. Denis, Entrepreneurial Finance: An Overview of the Issues and 
Evidence, 10 J. CORP. FIN. 301, 304 (2004) (“Because [start-ups] are typically not yet 
profitable and lack tangible assets, debt financing is usually not an option.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Duke K. Bristow et al., Venture Capital Formation and Access: 
Lingering Impediments of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 77, 81 (stating that small businesses “now account for almost all of the new 
jobs created”); SBA Office of Advocacy, Small Business Resources for Faculty, 
Students, and Researchers: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions (March 2004), 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/arsbfaq.pdf (stating that small businesses 
“[g]enerate 60 to 80 percent of net new jobs annually”). 
 4. See, e.g., Denis, supra note 2, at 301 (“[S]mall firms created more 
innovations than their large firm counterparts.”). 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 305–07 (reviewing the literature on the relationship 
between VCs and their portfolio companies); Josh Lerner, Venture Capitalists and 
the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FINANCE 301 (1995) (studying VCs’ monitoring of 
their portfolio companies). 
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preparation of a registration exposes the key participants to 
substantial liability.6 
Rule 1447 under the Securities Act of 1933 plays a key role in 
facilitating the transfer of securities once the company has become 
public.  Rule 144 provides a safe harbor for sales of unregistered 
shares to the public.  It enables certain investors who purchased 
shares in a private placement to sell the shares to the public 
without requiring the company to file a registration statement.  In 
practice, it is impossible to sell to the public unregistered shares of 
public companies without invoking Rule 144.8  Even if the company 
has a contractual obligation to register the investors’ shares when 
asked, large investors are likely not to exercise this contractual right 
because of the onerous effect on the company. 
While Rule 144 enables investors to avoid the costly 
registration requirements of the law, it imposes alternative 
requirements.  There are two key limits to the safe harbor of Rule 
144: a holding-period restriction and a selling-volume restriction.9  
Rule 144 imposes a holding period of one year for shares that 
investors acquired in a private placement.10  The holding period 
begins when the shares have been purchased and fully paid.11  The 
selling-volume restriction limits the amount of shares that can be 
sold following the expiration of the one-year holding period.12  
Each shareholder can sell shares under Rule 144 only up to an 
amount that, when added together with the shareholder’s sales in 
the previous three months, will not exceed a certain maximal 
amount.13  This maximal amount is either one percent of the 
company’s outstanding shares or the average reported weekly 
volume of trading of the company’s securities during the preceding 
four weeks, whichever is greater.14 
 
 6. See 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
§ 1.6 (5th ed. 2005). 
 7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006). 
 8. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW SERIES, GOING PUBLIC 
HANDBOOK, GOING PUBLIC, THE INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE SYSTEM AND EXEMPT 
FINANCING 100 (2002). 
 9. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)–(e).  
 10.  Id. § 230.144(d)(1). 
 11. Id.  In the case of options, the date the option is exercised, rather than 
the date the option is granted, marks the beginning of the holding period for the 
share issued pursuant to the option. 
 12.  See id. § 230.144(e). 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. § 230.144(e)(1)(i)–(iii). 
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Despite the widespread use and importance of Rule 144 in the 
business world, there has been little academic legal analysis of it.  
The academic legal literature often refers to its restrictions but 
mostly only as an example of diverse regulatory practices and not as 
the main focus of attention.15 
In 1988, Steinberg and Kempler offered a detailed 
examination of the requirements of Rule 144 and expressed 
concern about the magnitude of its safe harbor requirement.16  
They argued that Rule 144 is excessively permissive because after a 
certain holding period it allows non-affiliates17 to sell restricted 
shares18 without being subject to the selling-volume restriction.19  
They reasoned that “the detrimental effect on the capital trading 
markets and the investing public are identical, irrespective of 
whether one has affiliate status when reselling large quantities of 
stock.”20 
This article, in contrast, argues that the selling-volume and 
holding-period restrictions should be abolished rather than 
extended.  It shows that the selling-volume and holding-period 
restrictions of Rule 144 are not efficient and do not achieve their 
anticipated goal.21  Furthermore, it shows that Rule 144 has 
 
 15. See, e.g., Ronald Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition,              
88 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 335 (1988) (using Rule 144 as an example of the 
regulatory use of holding periods to deter exploitive investments); Ellen Taylor, 
Teaching an Old Law New Tricks: Rethinking Section 16, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1315, 1336 
(1997) (using Rule 144 as one example of the redundancy of section 16(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A 
Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 307 (2000) (using Rule 144 as an 
example of the failure of the securities regulations to protect the unsophisticated 
public investors). 
 16. See Marc I. Steinberg & Joseph P. Kempler, The Application and Effectiveness 
of SEC Rule 144, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (1998). 
 17. An affiliate of an issuer is defined in 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(1) (2006) as 
“a person that directly, or indirectly through one or more intermediaries controls, 
or is controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer.”  Id. 
 18. Restricted shares are shares acquired in unregistered private sales.  See id. 
§ 230.144(a)(3)(i). 
 19. See Steinberg & Kempler, supra note 16.  The current holding period of 
Rule 144, after which non-affiliates are no longer subject to the selling-volume 
restriction, is two years starting from the date of purchase of the stock.  The 
holding period was originally three years until the SEC shortened the duration to 
two years in 1997.  See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145 (February 20, 
1997), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7390.txt. 
 20. See Steinberg & Kempler, supra note 16, at 500. 
 21. See infra Part II.E. 
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distorting effects.22  Thus, this article presents the opposite 
conviction—the selling-volume restriction should not restrict any 
shareholder, regardless of whether such shareholder is an affiliate 
or non-affiliate.  Market forces, rather than statutory restrictions, 
are likely to achieve a more efficient outcome that will eliminate 
the distorting effects of Rule 144. 
Both the holding-period restriction and the selling-volume 
restriction impair investor liquidity.  The restrictions force 
shareholders to wait one year before they are allowed to sell their 
shares, even though a market for their shares may already exist.  
And once they are permitted to sell shares, they may do so only to 
the extent allowed by the selling-volume restriction.   
In this article, I show that the liquidity-reducing effects of Rule 
144 distort the financing of start-ups.  Rule 144 provides inefficient 
incentives and increases the cost of raising capital.  This is because 
Rule 144 is likely to restrict the amount an investor is willing to 
invest in a single company.  The selling-volume restriction allows 
each restricted shareholder to sell the same amount regardless of 
how many shares one owns.  Thus, the last share purchased by an 
investor bears a much higher liquidity risk than the first share.  
After investing a significant amount in a company, an investor 
considering purchasing additional shares is unlikely to be able to 
rely on Rule 144’s safe harbor for future sale of these shares.  Rule 
144, therefore, discourages potential investors from investing 
substantial amounts in one company. 
Thus, Rule 144 provides at least some explanation for a 
puzzling empirical finding.  Researchers were surprised to learn 
that, while VCs’ total investment more than doubled during the 
1980s, the average size of their investments increased by only forty 
percent.23  The selling-volume restriction of Rule 144 likely 
contributed to the VCs’ inefficient decision to refrain from further 
increasing their investment in a single company. 
As a result of the selling-volume restriction of Rule 144, the 
number of investors a company needs for financing increases.  The 
number of companies in which an investor invests increases, as 
 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See, e.g., George W. Fenn et al., The Economics of the Private Equity Market, 29 
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., STAFF STUDIES SERIES NO. 168 (1995), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/1990-99/ss168.pdf 
(“Somewhat surprisingly, data on investments suggest only moderate shifts toward 
larger investments and investments in later-stage new ventures.”). 
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well.  Generally, it is preferable and more cost-efficient, however, to 
have subsequent investment by the same investor.  Subsequent 
investments lower search and monitoring costs. 
Reduction in the amount a company can raise from a single 
investor increases transaction and search costs for both the 
company and the investors.  The investors are likely to look for 
multiple potential investments and closely inspect a number of 
companies.  Reinvesting in the same company, in contrast, would 
have required much less inspection, if any.  At the same time, the 
company has to look for additional potential investors, cooperate 
in several due-diligence processes, and coordinate multi-party 
negotiation processes, all of which are time-consuming and costly. 
Increase in the number of investors that invest in the same 
company has a negative effect on the monitoring of the company.  
Studies have shown that VCs are uniquely positioned to play an 
important role in the governance of their portfolio companies and 
that the VCs are participating in monitoring activities.24  
Monitoring a company, however, is a costly activity.  And the lower 
the stake an investor has in a company, the lower the investor’s 
personal benefits are from its own monitoring activities.  Thus, 
since Rule 144 decreases the amount an investor is willing to invest 
in a single company, it is also likely to lead to suboptimal levels of 
monitoring. 
In addition, Rule 144 can distort the financing decisions of the 
company.  By causing investors to hesitate to refinance and by 
increasing the cost of raising private equity, Rule 144 can force the 
company to go public too soon.  The choice of delaying public 
registration might not be available to the company because Rule 
144’s restrictions rendered this choice economically prohibitive.  
The company, however, might still be in a stage in which the 
benefits of staying private surpass those of going public. 
Alternatively, the company might be forced by its investors not 
to go public even at a time when going public is the most efficient 
strategic choice.  Investors are likely to prefer a different means of 
exit, such as a merger or an acquisition, to avoid Rule 144’s 
restrictions.  Rather than go public and become subject to the on-
sale restrictions of Rule 144, investors looking for liquidity may 
even prefer to sell the company at a cost lower than the valuation of 
 
 24. See Denis, supra note 2, at 305 (reviewing the literature on the 
relationship between VCs and their portfolio companies). 
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the company suggests. 
Furthermore, Rule 144 influences the company’s choice of 
stock exchange on which it will trade once it is public.  This 
influence occurs because Rule 144 sets the amount that may be 
sold under the safe harbor based on the trading volume of the 
company’s stock.25  The different trading methods of the stock 
exchanges cause similar transactions to result in different reports of 
trading volumes.26  Thus, Rule 144 encourages companies to favor 
the stock exchange where higher volume of trading is reported.  
Empirical studies found that Rule 144 influences the choice of the 
stock exchange.27  According to these studies, companies often 
choose the Nasdaq as the venue for their initial listing.  Companies 
traded on the Nasdaq often do not transfer their shares to the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) because of Rule 144, despite the 
potential increase in share value associated with listing on the more 
prestigious NYSE and lower trading costs. 
Because of these undesirable effects of Rule 144, I suggest 
eliminating both the selling-volume restriction and the holding-
period restriction.  This change will remove the illiquidity costs that 
investors incur and will lower the cost of capital for start-ups.  
Moreover, both the holding-period restriction and the selling-
volume restriction of Rule 144 undermine the main purpose of the 
law—to secure full and fair disclosure and to provide current 
information to the public.  Artificially limiting the sale of restricted 
shares held by sophisticated investors reduces the availability of 
information about the firm by camouflaging the value that these 
investors assign to the company.  If these investors were permitted 
 
 25. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1)(ii)–(iii) (2006). 
 26. See Kam-Ming Wan, The Effect of Insider Restricted Equity on the Choice of 
Exchange: An Empirical Study of the NYSE Listing Choices of NASDAQ Firms, SSRN 
ELEC. PAPER COLL. NO. 268010, at 3 (2001) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=268010 (“Nasdaq trading volume typically measures higher than NYSE trading 
volume for similar transactions.”); Anne Anderson, Edward Dyl & Laurie Krigman, 
Rule 144 and the IPO Exchange Listing Decision 4 (Feb. 2004) (unpublished 
working paper, on file with author) (“Nasdaq is a dealer market, whereas the 
NYSE is largely an auction market. . . . [T]he reported trading volume for a stock 
will be much higher when the stock trades in a dealer market than when it trades 
in an auction market.”). 
 27. See Wan, supra note 26, at 11 (illustrating how “the combination of the 
rule 144 and inflated trading volume on the Nasdaq give corporate insiders an 
option value to resell more of their company equities when their company is listed 
on the Nasdaq instead of on the NYSE”); see also Anderson et. al., supra note 26, at 
13 (reporting that “SEC Rule 144 . . . appears to affect the listing decisions of firms 
that are going public”). 
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to sell, a decision not to sell may indicate that they value the 
company at least as much as the price for which it is traded.  On 
the other hand, a decision to sell, absent liquidity constraints, 
would mean that the sophisticated investors believe that the market 
overvalues the company. 
Furthermore, since the initial public offering (IPO) 
registration statement includes a detailed account of the restricted 
shares purchased prior to the IPO,28 it should not come as a 
surprise if restricted shares enter the market.  A sale of such shares 
following the completion of the IPO process does not seem to 
harm the public, since it should expect such transactions.  Thus, 
eliminating Rule 144’s restrictions does not compromise the 
purposes for which it was promulgated.  And the holding-period 
restriction may even hurt the retail investors, since the detailed 
disclosures of the registration statement and the prospectus 
become less accurate with the lapse of time.  Therefore, allowing a 
sale of restricted shares to take place as early as possible may result 
in a more informed purchase transaction than a sale conducted 
after one year has elapsed. 
If, however, efficiency considerations require investors to limit 
the sale of shares purchased prior to the IPO, market forces will 
implement such limitations.  And the company itself is best suited 
to distribute selling rights among its restricted shareholders.  Each 
company should, therefore, be allowed to determine whether such 
sale should be permitted and, if so, under what limitations.  This 
change will promote an efficient allocation and pricing of selling 
rights.  Eliminating Rule 144’s restrictions will thus provide a more 
efficient investment incentive structure, reduce the disincentive to 
invest large amounts in a single company, and lessen the costs of 
raising capital. 
First, I provide a brief description of the current legal arena, 
which is the setting for the discussion offered by this article.29  The 
official rationale for Rule 144, along with a discussion of the failure 
of Rule 144 to fulfill its intended goals, is also presented.  In 
particular, this article elaborates on the two requirements of Rule 
144 that should be eliminated—the selling-volume restriction and 
holding-period restriction.  Next, it discusses the distorting effects 
of those requirements.30  Finally, this article questions the 
 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000). 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
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justification for the imposition of any on-sale restrictions following 
the IPO.31  It presents the argument for a market-forces regime in 
place of the rigid and inefficient selling-volume and holding-period 
restrictions of Rule 144.  It concludes that the two main restrictions 
of Rule 144 should be abolished because of the significant burdens 
they impose on emerging ventures.32 
II. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF PRIVATE EQUITY FINANCING 
With the growing importance of small firms, private equity’s 
fundamental contribution to the economic development is 
becoming increasingly evident.  Section A of this Part describes the 
important role of private equity financing in the development of 
small firms and new businesses.  This section further describes the 
value-added nature of VCs’ investments, which are far from being 
limited to the supply of much needed capital. 
The remainder of this Part describes certain aspects of the 
legal environment that control private financing.  Section B 
provides a general overview of the securities rules that affect every 
equity transaction and focuses on their application to VCs wishing 
to sell securities.  It also describes the historical background of the 
development of these rules.  Section C focuses on the safe harbor 
of Rule 144.  The section provides a description of the salient 
features of the selling-volume and holding-period restrictions of 
Rule 144, which are especially relevant to private equity financing. 
Section D further details the main concerns that Rule 144 was 
designed to address.  In addition, it describes how Rule 144 chose 
to deal with these concerns.  Finally, section E discusses the failure 
of Rule 144 to achieve its goal.  It also shows that Rule 144 is likely 
to aggravate some of the problems it was meant to solve and is 
likely to create additional problems. 
A. Private Equity Financing 
Entrepreneurial ventures are faced with the challenging task 
of securing funds for their operations.  At the early stages, before 
they reach profitability or obtain assets that can be used as valuable 
collateral, those companies almost exclusively rely on private 
equity. 
 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See infra Part V. 
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Studies have found a significant rise in the amount of capital 
allotted to the private equity market.33  At the same time, there has 
been a rise in the importance of entrepreneurial ventures to 
economic development.  For the last two decades, small firms have 
been responsible for the creation of the majority of new jobs and 
the majority of innovations.34 
VCs provide entrepreneurial ventures with crucial capital 
needed for the daily operations and growth.  Though not the 
exclusive source for private equity, VCs are a dominant source of 
capital for emerging companies that passed the seed stage (the 
initial early stage of development).35 
VCs are also active investors; in addition to providing valuable 
capital, they are providing their portfolio companies with added 
value.  The literature has identified three main types of roles that 
VCs assume in order to help their portfolio companies.36  Under 
the first role, VCs offer their portfolio companies a range of 
support services that assist in building the internal organization of 
the companies and in marketing the companies’ products.37  They 
are particularly influential in the development of the companies’ 
business plans.  VCs are also well known for being instrumental in 
forming strategic alliances. 
The second important role that VCs assume is that of 
monitoring.38  As part of their governance activities, the VCs 
frequently visit their portfolio companies, often serve on the boards 
of such companies, and are involved in shaping the top 
management team.  The third role of VCs is certifying the quality 
of the start-ups in which they have invested.39  The VCs’ reputation 
often helps the companies to raise additional funds. 
B. The Securities Rules and the Restrictions on Venture Capitalists Selling 
 
 33. See, e.g., Denis, supra note 2, at 301–02 (reporting the amounts committed 
to venture capital funds in the years 1992–2001). 
 34. Id. at 301 (describing the importance of small firms to the U.S. economy). 
 35. Id. at 304 (“[E]ntrepreneurs tend to rely on three primary sources of 
outside equity financing: venture capital funds, angel investors, and corporate 
investors. . . . [A]ll three sources contribute a substantial amount of capital to 
entrepreneurial firms.”). 
 36. Id. at 305–07 (reviewing the literature on the relationship of VCs and 
their portfolio companies). 
 37. Id. at 306. 
 38. Id. at 305–06. 
 39. Id. at 306–07 (reviewing the literature on VCs certifying the quality of 
their portfolio companies). 
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Securities 
The stock market collapse of 1929 and the Great Depression 
that followed were partially blamed on securities fraud.40  Such 
fraud included abuse of holding companies, insider trading, and 
accounting scandals.  This led to the realization that federal 
legislation was needed.41  Congress enacted the Securities Act of 
1933 (1933 Act), which is also known as the “Truth in Securities” 
Act.42  The 1933 Act intended to provide adequate protection to 
investors by disclosing, fully and fairly, all the aspects of the 
marketed securities.43 
The 1933 Act is directed primarily at the distribution of 
securities, the process by which securities are first offered to the 
public.  Generally, the 1933 Act requires the registration of all 
securities being distributed, either directly by the issuer or 
indirectly by an investor in a secondary distribution (i.e., a 
distribution of shares previously issued by the company to the 
selling shareholders).  In the year that followed, Congress enacted 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), which was 
intended to regulate all aspects of publicly traded securities.44 
In order to comply with the registration requirement, the 
company has to file a registration statement, which is a disclosure 
document, with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).45  
The filing of the registration statement potentially discloses 
sensitive confidential information on the company.  In addition, 
the process of preparing a registration statement is not only 
expensive and time consuming, but also exposes the key 
participants in the registration to substantial liability for failing to 
 
 40. See, e.g., 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.2; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 251 (1987) (“[The Securities] Act was passed in 1933 . . 
. in response to the market crash of 1929.  The Act was designed to remedy abuses 
in the securities industry, particularly fraud and misrepresentation by securities-
industry personnel, that had contributed to that disastrous event.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Paul M. Clikeman, The Greatest Frauds of the (Last) Century, NEW 
ACCT., May 2003 (describing the major accounting frauds of the twentieth century, 
including the Kreuger & Toll fraud, and noting that such frauds lead to the 
enactment of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934), available at http:// 
www.newaccountantusa.com/newsFeat/wealthManagement/Clikeman_Greatest_ 
Frauds.pdf. 
 42. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.2. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. §§ 1.1–.2; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a 
(2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 45. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 1.6. 
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comply strictly with the disclosure requirements.46  Thus, the 
company will prefer to avoid filing a registration statement and will 
be reluctant to register the investors’ shares.  Furthermore, the 
company’s own plans for raising capital might be negatively 
affected by a registration of the investors’ previously issued shares. 
Absent a contractual right, an investor might not be able to 
convince the company to register its shares with the SEC.  In the 
customary investment agreements, the company grants the 
investors a right to force the company to register the investors’ 
shares.  This right, which is called a demand right, is customarily 
limited both in how often it can be exercised and in the ability to 
exercise.  Usually no more than three demand rights are granted, 
and only investors that hold a majority of the class shares are 
allowed to initiate such exercise.47 
In practice, however, demand rights are rarely exercised.48  
The choice not to exercise these rights is likely to result from both 
the high costs that the company would incur from such exercise 
and the lack of managerial support for the registration.  The 
investor, though wishing to sell its shares, is interested in the cost of 
such sale to the company.  This is because such cost affects the 
price the investor can receive for the shares and the value of any 
shares it might decide not to sell.  In addition, managerial support 
is important to the success of a registration.49  Also, in an 
underwritten registration in which numerous shares are sold, as 
opposed to a gradual sale of shares to the market, underpricing of 
the stock is likely to occur.  Thus, even the receipt of a contractual 
right to register one’s shares by the company does not render the 
registration option a viable one for an investor who wishes to sell its 
shares.  Despite the fact that the rights to demand registration are 
typically not going to be exercised, investors insist on being granted 
these rights for a different reason—to obtain future leverage 
against the company and not in order to be able to register the 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. See, e.g., Richard A. Mann et al., Starting from Scratch: A Lawyer’s Guide to 
Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773 (2004) (describing the terms of 
a typical VC financing transaction). 
 48. See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information Age, 
2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 151 (1998) (describing the registration rights 
in venture capital financing agreements). 
 49. See 1 JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, 
RESTRUCTURINGS, AND REORGANIZATIONS § 9.4, at 195 (2d ed. 1995). 
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shares in the future.50 
The 1933 Act provides certain exemptions from its registration 
requirement.51  The section 4(1) exemption,52 also known as the 
exemption for non-professionals, was designed to facilitate the day-
to-day trading transactions between individual investors with 
respect to securities already issued, rather than the distribution of 
securities.  The section 4(1) exemption allows most of the day-to-
day trading between investors on the exchanges and the over-the-
counter markets to take place.  It provides a registration exemption 
for transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or 
dealer.53  Generally, the 1933 Act defines an underwriter as anyone 
who purchases a security from the issuer with a view to distribute 
the security (including anyone who indirectly participates 
therein).54  One key criterion in determining whether a security was 
purchased with a view toward distribution is whether the would-be 
underwriter had sufficient investment intent at the time of 
purchase.55 
The case law, the SEC’s interpretation of what the Act deems 
an underwriter, and the scope of the exemption under section 4(1) 
have not provided much practical guidance for the sale of 
restricted securities.  Each decision as to whether the registration 
requirement was triggered required an analysis of all the particular 
circumstances and was very fact specific.56  The decisions regarding 
those issues were frequently confusing and often appeared 
inconsistent.57 
C. Rule 144 
In 1972, in order to clear some of the uncertainty, the SEC 
promulgated Rule 144,58 which provides some guidance for 
 
 50. See Douglas G. Smith, The Venture Capital Company: A Contractarian Rebuttal 
to the Political Theory of American Corporate Finance?, 65 TENN. L. REV. 79, 130 (1997) 
(“Although there may be practical constraints on the exercise of demand 
registration rights, they still may be utilized as leverage over management of the 
portfolio company.”). 
 51. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, §§ 4.1, .21. 
 52. See Securities Act of 1933 § 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (2000). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11). 
 55. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, §§ 4.23–.24. 
 56. See id. at 256 (“The one clear lesson of the cases and SEC decisions is that 
section 2(11)’s definition of underwriter is a trap for the careless and unwary.”). 
 57. Id. § 4.26. 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006). 
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answering the question of who is an underwriter and thereby 
defines the scope of the statutory exemption under section 4(1).  
Rule 144 is not the exclusive method by which restricted securities 
may be sold in reliance on an exemption.  But reliance on 
precedents, rather than on Rule 144, imposes a substantial burden 
of proof to establish that an exemption is available.59  In fact, “[t]he 
liberality of the rule and the attitudes of the Commission, issuers 
and their counsel generally have made sales of restricted securities 
of public reporting companies outside of Rule 144 imprudent or 
impossible.”60 
Rule 144 provides a safe harbor to investors who purchased 
their shares in a transaction not involving a public offering, such as 
transactions that occurred prior to the IPO in an unregistered 
private placement.61  The safe harbor allows such investors to sell 
their shares to the public without registering those shares with the 
SEC, as required by section 5 of the 1933 Act,62 subject to certain 
limitations.63  The two main limitations are: (1) time restrictions 
and (2) volume restrictions.64  Section (d) of Rule 144 allows sales 
only following the lapse of a holding period—one year beginning 
from the date of purchase.65  Section (e) of Rule 144 allows each 
restricted shareholder to sell restricted shares only up to a 
restricted amount.66  This amount of restricted shares, together 
with the amount of restricted shares that the shareholder sold 
during the preceding three months, shall not exceed the greater of 
one percent of the outstanding shares or the average reported 
weekly volume of trading67 in the securities during the preceding 
four calendar weeks.68 
 
 59. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.26. 
 60. See BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 8, at 100. 
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
 62. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2000). 
 63. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)–(e). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. § 230.144(d). 
 66. Id. § 230.144(e). 
 67. In order for the safe harbor to apply, the class of shares sold must be 
listed on a stock exchange or quoted on Nasdaq, not merely traded over the 
counter. 
 68. Id. § 230.144(e)(1)(i)–(iii).  It should be noted that shareholders who are 
not affiliates of the company may freely sell their restricted shares after the lapse 
of another year following the expiration of the one year holding period. Affiliates 
are also subject to the one year holding period.  Id. § 230.144(d)(1).  Affiliates, 
however, are always restricted by the volume limitation, even after the lapse of two 
years and even if they wish to sell shares acquired in the public market after the 
14
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D. The Official Rationale of Rule 144 
The Preliminary Note to Rule 144 describes the concerns that 
Rule 144 intended to address.69  The restrictions to the safe harbor 
of Rule 144 attempt to resolve three major concerns.  First, Rule 
144 was designed to implement the purpose of the 1933 Act under 
which it was promulgated—to provide full and fair disclosure to the 
public and prevent fraud in the sale of securities.70  Thus, Rule 144 
was designed to protect investors by preventing the creation of 
public markets in securities absent adequate current information 
concerning the issuer.  In order to achieve this purpose, Rule 144 
requires current public information about the company as a 
condition of the use of the safe harbor.71  Rule 144(c) states that 
the safe harbor is available only if the company complies with the 
periodic reporting requirements of the 1934 Act.72  In addition, 
Rule 144(h) requires a shareholder that uses the safe harbor to file 
a notice with the SEC if the sales exceed a certain threshold.73  Rule 
144 allows submitting the notice concurrently with the sale.74 
Second, the holding-period restriction of Rule 144 was 
designed to ensure that the restricted shareholders have personally 
assumed the economic risks of their investment at the time they 
purchased the shares and are not acting on behalf of the company 
as its underwriters.75  This is because the safe harbor under Rule 
 
IPO.  Id. § 230.144(k). 
 69. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c). 
 72. Id. § 230.144(c)(1).  Because the availability of the safe harbor is subject 
to the company fulfilling its reporting requirements under the 1934 Act, 
customary investment agreements include a provision that contractually obligates 
the company to comply with all the necessary requirements to allow the investors 
to use Rule 144’s safe harbor.  See Smith, supra note 50, at 131 (“Registration rights 
provisions often state that the portfolio company will make all filings or take other 
actions necessary to allow venture capital investors to sell their shares . . . in the 
public market pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities Act of 1933.”). 
 73. Id. § 230.144(h).  The threshold for the current filing requirement is a 
sale of more than 500 shares or proceeds of an aggregate dollar amount greater 
than $10,000 in any three-month period.  Id. 
 74. Id.  To be sure, an advance-notice requirement, along the lines of the 
proposal by Jesse Fried, to require insiders to disclose their intended trading 
shortly beforehand in order to reduce profits from insider trading, would help 
achieve a more transparent and efficient securities market.  See Jesse Fried, 
Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure,      
71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303 (1998). 
 75. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
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144 is intended to exempt transactions between individual investors 
from registration and not to exempt sales by the company to the 
public.76  Sales by the company to the public, on the other hand, 
require full compliance with the registration provisions of the Act 
in order to protect the public. 
Third, the selling-volume restriction of Rule 144 was designed 
to allow only routine trading transactions, as permitted under 
section 4(1) of the Act, rather than distributions.77  A distribution is 
a public offering and usually involves a large amount of securities.78  
This restriction is concerned with the impact of the transaction on 
the market and limits the quantities allowed to be sold, in any given 
time, to avoid disrupting the market.  Thus, the ceiling set by the 
selling-volume restriction is linked to the volume of trading of the 
stock.79  The volume of trading of a stock plays an important role in 
trading.  It is an important role because the ratio of the size of a 
transaction to the trading volume is an indicator of the impact the 
transaction will have on the price of the stock.  The higher the 
ratio, the greater the price pressure caused by the transaction.80 
E. The Failure of Rule 144 in Achieving Its Goals 
Section D described the objectives of the regulator in 
promulgating Rule 144.  This section will show that Rule 144 does 
not succeed in fulfilling its intended goals.  First, while Rule 144 is 
intended to promote the availability of information to the public, 
the restrictions of the Rule are likely to result in less informed sales.  
Second, because Rule 144 ignores the general assumption of 
economic risk by private investors, it excessively restricts 
 
 76. Excluding from the safe harbor sales by issuers and underwriters is 
consistent with the exemption of section 4(1) of the 1933 Act, under which Rule 
144 was promulgated.  See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 77. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
 78. See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 4.24; see also Ackerberg v. Johnson, 892 F.2d 
1328, 1335 n.6 (8th Cir. 1989) (stating that a distribution is “in turn . . . 
considered the equivalent of a public offering”). 
 79. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(1)(ii)–(iii). 
 80. Microcap companies are companies with low capitalization.  Because of 
low volumes of trading, “microcap companies” provide an extreme example of the 
connection between trading volume and the effect of trade on the price of the 
stock.  In an SEC guide for investors, the SEC warns the public of the risks of 
investing in microcap companies, citing as one of these risks the extreme 
sensitivity of the stock price to trading because of the low volume of trading.  See 
U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MICROCAP STOCK: A GUIDE FOR 
INVESTORS (2004), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/microcapstock.htm. 
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transactions.  Third, whereas Rule 144 attempts to promote market 
stability, it fails to contribute efficiently to this goal. 
1. Delayed Sales and Public Information 
Contrary to Rule 144’s intent to assure that the public has 
current information about the company when it purchases shares, 
the restrictions of the rule may negatively affect the information 
the public has at the time of the sale.  After the selling restrictions 
of Rule 144 expire, the public is likely to be less informed than it is 
at the time of the IPO (or secondary offering) because substantial 
time has passed since the filing of the registration statement.  The 
detailed disclosures of the registration statement and the 
prospectus become less accurate with the lapse of time.  Following 
the IPO, the press, analysts, and certain sophisticated investors 
usually manage to acquire access to some new information about 
the company, but such information is limited in scope and accuracy 
in comparison to the disclosures that the company is required to 
make as part of the registration process.  The company is under no 
obligation to assist in the exposure of such new information.  The 
company’s cooperation, however, is likely to be offered to the 
underwriters who engage in a due diligence process as part of the 
preparation of the registration, since all of the participants 
preparing the registration statement, and especially the company, 
are liable for misstatements or omissions.81 
Even though Rule 144(c) requires that updated information 
about the company will be available, the registration statement 
provides more information and is subject to the scrutiny of the 
underwriters’ counsels and auditors who perform a due diligence 
review of the company.  Rule 144(c) requires only that the 
company comply with the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act,82 
which are basically periodic disclosure requirements with some 
exceptions, such as Form 8-K reporting requirements of 
extraordinary corporate events.83 
 
 81. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); see also 1 HAZEN, 
supra note 6, § 7.3. 
 82. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c). 
 83. In 2002, the SEC expanded the scope of the 8-K filing of material events 
of corporate changes and shortened the filing deadline in a move away from a 
periodic disclosure regime toward a materiality regime of real-time disclosure 
mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 409, 
Pub.L.107-204 (2002).  For the SEC’s rule regarding Additional Form 8-K 
Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, see 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594 
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The periodic reporting is less detailed and subject to less 
scrutiny than the registration statement.  The periodic reporting is 
literally periodic, triggered by the passage of time rather than the 
occurrence of material events.84  Generally, there is no duty to 
disclose new information, beyond extraordinary corporate events, 
between the reports.85  In addition, the scope of most of the 
periodic reports is limited, and the quarter financial reports are not 
required to be audited.86  Thus, allowing a sale of restricted shares 
as early as possible and in particular, prior to the expiration of the 
holding period, may result in a more informed purchase 
transaction than a sale taking place after a year has expired. 
Furthermore, before the selling restrictions expire, the 
original investors’ sentiments about the value of the stock relative 
to the market price are camouflaged.  By artificially delaying sales, 
Rule 144 impedes the ability of the market price to reflect the 
valuations attributed to the stock by the entire market.  
Unsophisticated investors are likely to misinterpret the fact that the 
original shareholders retain their holdings in the company as a sign 
of the original investors’ sentiments about the company, rather 
than as a product of a legal restraint.  The holding-period 
restriction as well as the selling-volume restriction undermine the 
main purpose of Rule 144, namely to secure full and fair disclosure 
and to provide current information to the public.  Artificially 
limiting the sale of the restricted shares (by delaying it, as the 
holding-period restriction does, or—and this is practically also a 
partial delay—by rationing the amount that may be sold at each 
given time, as the selling-volume restriction does) is hindering the 
availability of information about the real sentiments of the 
 
(Mar. 25, 2004) (“We are adding eight new items to the list of events that require a 
company to file a current report on Form 8-K . . . . These amendments . . . shorten 
the Form 8-K filing deadline . . . . These amendments are responsive to the ‘real 
time issuer disclosure’ provision in Section 409 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
They are intended to provide investors with better and faster disclosure of 
important corporate events.”). 
 84. See Steven E. Bochner & Samir Bukhari, The Duty to Update and Disclosure 
Reform: The Impact of Regulation FD and Current Disclosure Initiatives, 7 STAN. J. L. BUS. 
& FIN. 225, 228 (2002) (“Under the federal securities laws, materiality does not 
automatically translate into an obligation to disclose information; a duty must 
exist.  As succinctly put by the U.S. Supreme Court in the famous case Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, ‘silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.’”). 
 85. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000 & Supp. 
2004). 
 86. See id. 
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restricted shareholders about the company’s valuation.  The 
restrictions obstruct the picture of the market valuation of the 
company’s shares, and the real decisions of the initial investors 
whether to maintain their holdings or dismiss them are not 
revealed to the public. 
2. Economic Stake and Length of Investment 
Rule 144 intends to provide a safe harbor to sales that do not 
involve the issuer.  Rule 144, however, restricts investors much 
more than is necessary to ensure that the registration requirements 
are not circumvented by the issuer.  It seems that Rule 144 ignores 
the general assumption of economic risks by private placement 
investors purchasing their shares before the IPO and that Rule 144 
thus excludes from the safe harbor such shareholders unless they 
have held the shares for a lengthy time. 
No investor can assume with absolute certainty that the 
company it invests in will succeed in going public, let alone succeed 
shortly after the closing of the investment.  A shareholder who 
purchases shares before the company goes public assumes the full 
risk of the company’s failure to finalize a registration and become 
public.  Even mezzanine investments, which are venture capital 
investments in relatively advanced companies that have passed the 
start-up stage, though just barely, and are on the verge of going 
public, are risky economic private investments. 
Investors that purchased shares in a mezzanine round of 
investment, when it seemed that the company was about to go 
public and its management was actively planning such a move, did 
not always see the company go public.  Those investors were often 
left with shares of a private company without the ability to realize 
profits, or even to sell the shares for any price, for years thereafter.  
This was especially the case for investment transactions that closed 
shortly before the burst of the technology bubble.  Thus, the risk 
associated with participating in a private placement transaction is 
so significant that it seems unnecessary to add another deterrent, 
such as a holding-period restriction, merely because of the concern 
that the investor, without assuming the economic risks of its 
investment, might be a “conduit[] for sale to the public of 
unregistered securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an 
issuer.”87 
 
 87. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
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The concern of Rule 144 with restricted shares that were 
acquired prior to the IPO becomes irrelevant after the filing of the 
IPO registration statement.  The registration statement has to 
include a detailed account of the restricted shares and the rights 
attached thereto.88  The filing requirements associated with going 
public are intended to inform the public and, in a sense, rectify 
and redeem those previously acquired shares for the purpose of the 
1933 Act.  A resale transaction by a private investor that acquired its 
shares prior to the IPO is not similar to a transaction in which 
securities are issued by the company itself following the IPO.  The 
latter involves a change in the capital structure of the company and 
a decision to raise more funds by the company, while the former 
does not. 
Following the IPO, a sale of shares purchased prior to the IPO 
should not be viewed as a distribution within the meaning of the 
1933 Act.  This should be the case even if the shares were 
purchased as a mezzanine investment, and even with the intent to 
sell such shares in the future, as long as it is done in the manner 
specified under Rule 144.  The Rule imposes sufficient conditions 
for the application of the safe harbor without the need for the 
onerous holding-period and selling-volume restrictions.  Indeed, 
Rule 144(f) imposes a manner-of-sale condition that prohibits 
solicitation of orders to buy and requires the use of a broker or a 
market maker for the sale.89  The payment to such broker cannot 
exceed the usual and customary broker’s commission.  Rule 144(c) 
also adds a current public information requirement that permits 
sales, subject to the other requirements of Rule 144, only if the 
company has complied with the periodic reporting requirements 
under the 1934 Act.90 
Chronologically, there are two types of transactions: (1) private 
placements occurring prior to the actual IPO; and (2) issuances 
not involving any public offerings that take place following the 
IPO.91  One might want to distinguish between securities purchased 
in a private placement before the IPO and those purchased after 
the IPO.  With regard to issuances preceding the IPO, the fact that 
the registration statement must include a detailed description of 
such issuances should be enough.  When it comes to issuances 
 
 88. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000). 
 89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(f). 
 90. Id. § 230.144(c). 
 91. See id. § 230.144(a)(3). 
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following the IPO, there seems to be a more justified concern 
about the issuer trying to avoid an additional registration by using 
exempt private placements with the intent that public resale will 
soon follow.  In such an event, if the new shareholders are able to 
resell their shares in the market easily, the company might be able 
to circumvent the requirements associated with another public 
offering.  However, the “manner of sale” condition of Rule 14492 
and the current-information requirement,93 along with the Form   
8-K reporting requirements,94 seem to ease the concern especially 
regarding the former type of transactions. 
3. Market Stabilization and Limitation on Sales 
The restrictions of Rule 144 do not contribute effectively to 
the stabilization of the market and prevention of extreme price 
fluctuations.  The restrictive effect of Rule 144 on the volume of 
trading of the company varies with the number of restricted 
shareholders that the company has.  The selling-volume restriction 
is not sensitive to the effect of the aggregate sales by all the 
restricted shareholders on the trading volume of the company.  
Thus, Rule 144 does not effectively control the aggregate increase 
in the volume of trading because it only limits sales by each 
individual shareholder and ignores the number of shareholders.95 
Furthermore, in spite of the sale restrictions of Rule 144, 
underwriters find it necessary to administer lock-up agreements 
that contractually limit the sale of stock acquired before the IPO 
for the purpose of stabilizing the market.96  The ubiquity of lock-up 
agreements indicates that Rule 144 fails to stabilize the market.  
The underwriters’ lock-ups are different from Rule 144’s 
requirements both in the length of time during which the sale is 
restricted and in the amount of shares that are restricted.  This 
suggests that while stabilizing the market is desired,97 it can be 
 
 92. Id. § 230.144(b). 
 93. Id. § 230.144(c). 
 94. Id. 
 95. For a numerical example, illustrating the selling-volume restriction’s 
ineptitude to prevent significant volume increases following sales of restricted 
stock, see infra Part III.C. 
 96. See SEC, Initial Public Offerings, Lockup Agreements, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/lockup.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (describing the typical lock-up 
agreement). 
 97. Stabilizing the market is especially important in the immediate period 
that follows the IPO.  See 1 HAZEN, supra note 6, § 6.1. 
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achieved by the market without external intervention.  Rule 144’s 
attempt to stabilize the market is thus redundant at best.  
Comparing the requirements of Rule 144 and the customary lock-
up agreements suggests that Rule 144 is excessively restrictive 
because it imposes a holding period that in some cases may last 
longer than the customary lock-up period of six months.98 
Not only does Rule 144 fail to achieve its intended purpose, as 
this Part shows, its restrictions have additional negative effects.  
Such effects, which will be described in the next section of this 
article, include increases in the cost of raising capital and 
inefficient investment incentives. 
III.  DISTORTIONS CAUSED BY RULE 144 
Rule 144, in its current form, induces inefficient behavior and 
provides the wrong incentives.  To be sure, Rule 144 is harmful to 
investors that hold restricted shares because such investors are 
directly restricted by it.  Rule 144 adversely affects the public 
because they may be less informed when purchasing the company’s 
shares.99  The company is also hurt because Rule 144 makes it more 
difficult for the company to raise capital.  The discussion in this 
Part will focus on Rule 144’s effects on the company. 
Section A of this Part describes the increase in the cost of 
capital incurred by emerging companies because of Rule 144.  The 
cost increase is a direct result of the restrictions on the investors’ 
ability to liquidate their investment.  Section B discusses the effect 
of the reduced liquidity on the ability of the VCs to finance 
investments in inefficient capital markets.  The reduction in 
available funds hurts the ability of emerging ventures to receive 
financing from VCs.  Section C presents the problem of suboptimal 
investment that Rule 144 creates.  It also describes the pressure not 
to invest significant amounts in a single start-up.  The section 
further describes the costs that are generated because of the 
inefficiently low levels of investments that each VC is willing to 
invest in a single start-up.  Such costs include higher search costs, 
higher investigation costs, reduced monitoring, and the increased 
risk of conflicts of interests.  Section D describes the negative 
 
 98. The underwriters’ six month lock-up period starts at the IPO.  The Rule 
144 holding period, on the other hand, starts at the time the stock is originally 
purchased.  Thus, the effective length of Rule 144 restriction on sale as of the IPO 
depends on the time of purchase. 
 99. See supra Part II.E.1. 
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effects of Rule 144 on the financing decision of the company.  The 
Section shows how Rule 144 is likely to play a pivotal role in the 
company’s decision of when and where to go public. 
A. Increase in the Cost of Capital 
The ability of a shareholder to sell securities freely is valuable.  
The market views illiquidity as a cost.100  The investor faces the risk 
that, should it be in need of funds while its investments are illiquid, 
it will be forced to bear borrowing costs or lose a promising new 
investment.  In addition, illiquidity exposes the shareholder to the 
risk of losing the value of its investment.  Reducing a VC’s liquidity 
increases its risk-bearing costs.  It is faced with the risk that the 
value of its shares will fall, yet it will be prevented from divesting its 
investment and from diversifying the risk by lowering the amount 
of such shares in its portfolio.  In effect, the VC will be forced to 
choose different venues to mitigate the risk.  VCs are particularly 
sensitive to liquidity since they are expected to convert their 
investments into cash or marketable securities after a relatively 
short time.101 
The restrictions of Rule 144, however, impede the liquidity of 
the holders of restricted securities.  Such holders are artificially 
forced to wait before they are allowed to sell their shares, even 
though a market for their shares already exists.  The holding-
period restriction renders the restricted shares completely illiquid 
for the duration of the holding period. 
The extent of the liquidity that is permitted by the selling-
volume restriction is basically determined by two factors.  The first 
factor is the volume of trading of the company’s shares102—a 
variable over which the shareholder has no direct control and 
 
 100. See, e.g., David Goldreich et al., The Price of Future Liquidity: Time-Varying 
Liquidity in the U.S. Treasury Market, 9 REV. FIN. 1 (2005) (finding that the value of 
securities depends on their expected liquidity); Viral V. Acharya & Lasse H. 
Pedersen, Asset Pricing with Liquidity Risk, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 375 (2005) (showing that 
the securities’ price depends on the liquidity risk of the securities). 
 101. See, e.g., Fenn et al., supra note 23, at 29 (studying the private equity 
markets and describing the VCs’ investing behavior); D. Gordon Smith, The Exit 
Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 345 (2005) (“Exit is not merely 
optional for venture capitalists.  Most venture capital funds have a fixed life . . . . 
Any venture capitalist who desires to remain in business, therefore, must 
successfully raise funds, invest them in portfolio companies, then exit the 
companies and return the proceeds to the fund investors . . . .”). 
 102. For a description of Rule 144(e)’s volume restriction, see supra notes    
66–68 and accompanying text. 
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which often cannot be accurately predicted.  The other factor is the 
number of shares held by such shareholder.  The liquidity of the 
shareholder is positively correlated with the first factor—the 
volume of trading—and negatively correlated with the latter 
factor—the number of shares the shareholder owns.  As long as the 
volume of trading is not exceptionally high and the holdings of the 
shareholder are not extremely small, the selling-volume restriction 
is responsible for the partial illiquidity of the shareholder. 
As described below, in addition to liquidity constraints, the 
investors incur further costs as a result of Rule 144.  All of the 
investing costs that the investors incur are taken into account when 
they negotiate with the start-up.  In order to compensate 
themselves, the investors shift at least part of the excessive cost to 
the company and increase the return they demand from it.  This 
raises the cost of capital with which start-ups have available.  Thus, a 
start-up that wishes to raise capital is faced with more obstacles.  
The start-up is forced by the investors to bear the higher costs that 
the restrictions of Rule 144 generate.  Hence, the increased cost of 
capital makes it more expensive and difficult for start-ups to receive 
financing. 
B. Reduction in Resources Available to Emerging Ventures 
Reducing the liquidity of investors locks their resources in a 
mature investment while hindering their ability to support an 
alternative new investment in imperfect capital markets.  It would 
be more efficient, though, if the investors that are less risk averse 
and more capable of assessing the risk supported the new 
investment while the public invests in the mature investment.  This 
is especially relevant to resources of investors like VCs that support 
emerging start-ups in their initial steps.  In these initial stages, it is 
too risky for the unsophisticated public to invest because it lacks 
the needed expertise.  Due to market inefficiency, VCs might not 
be able to raise enough funds from institutions to allow them to 
invest at an optimal level.  Restricting the ability to liquidate VCs’ 
investments once the companies are public is likely to further 
reduce the availability of funds for new investments.  Thus, one of 
the outcomes of Rule 144 is that fewer resources are available for 
emerging ventures. 
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C. Suboptimal Investment 
Rule 144 discourages investors from acquiring large amounts 
of a single company.  Investors are likely to prefer to invest smaller 
amounts in more companies, rather than larger amounts in fewer 
companies.  This is because the liquidation rights granted under 
Rule 144’s safe harbor are disproportionate to the amount of 
restricted shares a shareholder has. 
The formula to calculate the maximum amount of restricted 
shares a shareholder may sell under Rule 144 does not take into 
account how many shares the shareholder owns.  Rule 144 does not 
distinguish among shareholders; it states the maximum allowed 
amount per shareholder without taking into account the size of its 
holdings, the number of other holders of restricted shares or the 
aggregate amount of restricted shares.103  Since Rule 144 allows 
each shareholder to sell up to the same maximum amount, one 
shareholder may liquidate one hundred percent of its holdings 
while a bigger shareholder may only liquidate a small fraction of its 
holdings. 
In contrast, customary contractual arrangements that are in 
effect prior to the IPO link rights of shareholders to their 
percentage holdings (e.g. participation in first refusal rights—the 
right to participate in future issuances of the company and in co-
sale rights—the right to participate in a sale transaction by certain 
shareholders).104  Market behavior in similar circumstances 
indicates an efficient contractual arrangement. 
Rule 144 links the right to sell with the shareholder rather 
than with the share.  Each restricted shareholder is allowed to sell 
the same amount regardless of the size of its holdings.105  Thus, the 
last share purchased is accompanied by a much higher risk of 
illiquidity than the first.  After a certain amount of investment, the 
shareholder knows that he or she will not be able to use the safe 
harbor of Rule 144 for selling any of the new shares that it 
purchases. 
Consider the following example.  To illustrate the effect of 
Rule 144, let us look at two hypothetical companies:  Company A 
and Company B.  Company A has one restricted shareholder who 
 
 103. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(2). 
 104. To be sure, other contractual arrangements that are not strictly financial, 
such as veto rights and rights to nominate directors, often are not proportionate 
to the shareholders’ percentage holdings. 
 105. Id. 
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has 100 restricted shares.  Company B has ten restricted 
shareholders owning ten restricted shares each.  Other than that, 
the two companies are similar in all respects.  Assume that the 
average weekly trading volume for the last four weeks was ten 
shares for both companies.  Let us further assume that all of the 
restricted shareholders of both companies are eager to liquidate 
their respective holdings. 
The single restricted shareholder of Company A will sell ten 
shares in the market, increasing the volume of traded shares by ten.  
At the same time, the ten restricted shareholders of Company B will 
each sell ten shares, accumulating to a total of 100 shares.  We can 
see that Company B will experience an increase in the volume of 
trading of 100 shares, as opposed to only a ten shares increase in 
the volume of trading of Company A.  This result shows the 
weakness of Rule 144 in stabilizing the market; it does not 
effectively control the increase in the trading volume.  Thus, Rule 
144 does not effectively prevent excessive price pressure and 
market disruption.106 
 
Company No. of 
Rest. 
Shldrs.
Shares 
per 
Shldr. 
Total 
Rest. 
Shares 
Rule 144 
Sale Limit 
per Rest. 
Shldr. 
Total 
Shares 
Sold 
A 1 100 100 
(1x100)
10 10 
(1x10) 
B 10 10 100 
(10x10)
10 100 
(10x10) 
Rest. = restricted; Shldr. = shareholder 
 
Furthermore, as we can see from our example, Company B’s 
restricted shareholders were able to liquidate all of their restricted 
holdings, while Company A’s restricted shareholder was only able 
to liquidate a fraction of her restricted holdings—only ten percent.  
If she had diversified her investment and partially invested in 
Company B instead of continuing her support of Company A, she 
would have increased her liquidity.  Had she invested, for example, 
in ten similar companies, buying ten shares in each, instead of just 
focusing on Company A, she would have enjoyed full liquidity. 
Rule 144, therefore, has the effect of restricting the amount an 
 
 106. See supra Part II.E.3. 
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investor is willing to invest in one company, though it might be 
preferable and more cost-efficient to have subsequent investments 
by this same investor.  This effect of Rule 144 can provide at least a 
partial explanation of the empirical findings that have puzzled 
researchers.  According to these findings, while venture capital 
more than doubled during the 1980s, the average size of 
investment increased by only forty percent during the same period, 
in spite of the market-wide acknowledgement that efficiency 
requires an increase in the size of investments more than the 
increase in the number of investments.107 
It may be more efficient to have follow-on investments by the 
same investor, and it is, therefore, inefficient to limit the amount of 
shares an investor can sell under the safe harbor in the manner 
that Rule 144 does.  The costs of smaller-than-desirable investments 
in start-ups may involve: (1) additional searching costs by both the 
investors and the start-ups; (2) excessive due diligence costs;        
(3) suboptimal monitoring; and (4) increased conflicts of interest 
between investors and start-ups. 
1. Higher Search Costs 
Since Rule 144 has the effect of reducing the amount an 
investor is willing to invest in a single company, it is not enough to 
find a single promising venture in which to invest and reinvest.  
The investors incur additional search costs because they have to 
continue to look for additional investments.  Similarly, the 
company has to look for more investors.  Because one investor may 
not be willing to fund the company sufficiently, the company has to 
look for and deal with more than one potential investor.  This 
increases the search costs of the company and the company’s cost 
of capital. 
2. Higher Investigation Costs 
After an investor finds a company to invest in, it conducts 
detailed due diligence before finalizing the investment.  Unlike 
new investors, existing investors do not need to conduct costly, 
 
 107. See Fenn et al., supra note 23, at 14 (“Many market participants suggest 
that as the size of partnerships increases, increasing the average size of investments 
is more efficient than increasing the number of investments . . . . Somewhat 
surprisingly, data on investments suggest only moderate shifts toward larger 
investments . . . .”). 
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extensive due diligence on the company.  The existing investors 
already conducted such expensive research at the time they first 
invested in the company.  The existing investors are already 
shareholders of the company and often have board representation.  
Thus, they are kept informed of any material changes that take 
place since the original investment and are considerably familiar 
with the company.  The review of the company that they will 
require before reinvesting, if any, will be more focused and less 
expensive.  Because Rule 144 has the effect of increasing the 
number of new investors rather than reinvestments, it increases due 
diligence expenses that could have been prevented if existing 
investors reinvested. 
3. Reduced Monitoring 
The preinvestment screening process and the structure of the 
financial contracts provide VCs with unique access to information 
that facilitates monitoring.  The monitoring activities themselves, 
however, are costly.108 
The alignment of interests of the company with those of an 
individual shareholder declines with the decrease in percentage 
holdings of the latter.  The lower the stake of an investor in the 
company, the lower the investor’s incentive to monitor the 
operation of the company’s management.  An investor that invests 
less in a company internalizes less of the benefits of its own 
monitoring of the company.  Hence, Rule 144 might lead to less 
monitoring than is optimally desired. 
4. Increased Risk of Conflict of Interests 
The risk of a conflict of interest between an investor and one 
of its portfolio companies caused by a potential conflict between 
two portfolio companies increases with the addition of more 
portfolio companies in which an investor is invested.  The investor 
might inefficiently favor one company in place of the other because 
it is invested more in the former. 
This misalignment of interests between the company and the 
investor, aggravated by the increase in the number of ventures 
backed by the same investor, may provide the investor with 
incentives to steer the company toward an inefficient result.  To be 
 
 108. See Denis, supra note 2, at 305 (reviewing the literature on VCs’ 
monitoring activities and the effects of the associated costs). 
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sure, such behavior will be done in a subtle way, without raising the 
suspicion of the management of the company that is unaware of 
any specific conflicting interests.  The special role that VCs play in 
the emerging venture’s business, as described above,109 allows the 
VCs to influence the company opportunistically without raising 
doubts as to their hidden intentions. 
D. Distortion of the Company’s Financing Decisions 
A private company, looking to finance its operations, can try to 
do so in several ways.  It is likely to raise money in private financing 
transactions, in a public offer, or in a merger and acquisition deal 
(M&A).  The decision how to finance the operations is likely to be 
influenced by Rule 144, resulting in a less efficient choice.  This 
Section describes how, because of Rule 144, a company may 
inefficiently decide to refrain from or delay going public110 and it 
may, under certain circumstances, go public prematurely.111  
Furthermore, it may choose to be traded on a specific stock 
exchange because of Rule 144’s restrictions, not because of the 
merits of the exchange.112 
1. Delay in Going Public 
Even though it may be more efficient, the company might 
postpone or decide against going public because of investor 
pressure.  The investors may ask the company to find a different 
means of financing that provides easier liquidity prospects for the 
investors, such as M&A, which does not rely on Rule 144’s safe 
harbor.  Liquidity is especially important to VCs that structure their 
investment fund as a short-term investment vehicle.113  Accordingly, 
in the case of a start-up by the name of PowerDsine, it was reported 
that investors preferred a sale of their portfolio company to an IPO, 
even though the value of the company for the purposes of an IPO 
was about twenty-five percent higher than the valuation of the 
company that was negotiated for the purposes of a sale.114  Thus, 
 
 109. See supra Part II.A. 
 110. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 111. See infra Part III.D.2. 
 112. See infra Part III.D.3. 
 113. See Smith, supra note 101, at 316 (“The ability to control exit is crucial to 
the venture capitalist’s business model of short-term funding of nascent business 
opportunities.”). 
 114. See Sophie Shulman, PowerDsine Keeps Silent on Talk of Sale, HAARETZ.COM, 
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the liquidity constraints of a shareholder of a publicly traded 
company, aggravated by Rule 144 restrictions on sale, may motivate 
investors to prefer lower-value transactions over higher-value 
transactions and may influence the company not to go public. 
2. Going Public Too Soon 
The company might alternately be forced to go public too 
soon because the alternative private placement has become too 
expensive.  In general, the increase in the cost of private equity, 
due to the liquidity constraints imposed on investors by Rule 144, 
makes it harder for the company to find investors.  Furthermore, 
the old investors of the company might be reluctant to reinvest 
after having reached a certain level of investment because of the 
selling-volume restriction of Rule 144.115  After failing to secure 
private financing at an affordable price, the company is likely to 
turn to the public option. 
Even though there are benefits from becoming a public 
company, the process involves notable costs and risks.  The 
preparation of the registration statement by itself is a demanding 
task.  Once the company is registered, it is exposed to additional 
risks and costs, such as those required to comply with the 
mandatory periodic reporting.  The preparation of such reports is 
expensive, consumes management time, exposes those involved to 
liability, and divulges information that a private company may keep 
confidential.  In addition, a public company is more likely to be 
pressured to show quick returns, rather than focus on the long-
term performance of the company. 
 
Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/PrintArticleEn.jht 
ml?itemNo=403941. 
PowerDsine is engaged in talks concerning the sale of the company . . . . 
[T]he negotiations are centering on a company value of $170–200 
million . . . . While the company talks of a sale, it is also in the process of 
an IPO on the Nasdaq according to a value of $250 million before the 
money.  The company aims to raise $70–80 million . . . . In the event that 
PowerDsine reaches an agreement with the potential . . . buyer, company 
shareholders are expected to opt for the sale rather than the stock issue.  
While the sale would allow the shareholders to immediately realize their 
holdings, the public issue comes with a risk of a drop in the value of their 
investment. 
Id. 
 115. See supra Part III.C. 
30
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2007], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss4/9
6. GANOR - RC.DOC 4/22/2007  7:14:52 PM 
2007] RATIONALIZING RULE 144 1477 
3. Inefficient Choice of Stock Exchange 
Empirical studies have found that the selling-volume 
restriction of Rule 144 is an important factor that influences the 
choice of stock exchange and often results in an inefficient choice 
for the traded company.116  Because of Rule 144, companies often 
choose the Nasdaq as the venue for their initial listing,117 and 
companies traded on the Nasdaq often do not transfer their shares 
to the NYSE.  This is due to the difference in measuring trading 
volumes.  On the Nasdaq, a transaction may result in a reported 
volume of twice the size, compared to the reported volume of a 
similar transaction on the NYSE because of the different methods 
of trading.118  Despite the potential increase in share value 
associated with listing on the more prestigious NYSE,119 and lower 
trading costs,120 companies with investors that intend to sell a large 
number of restricted shares following the IPO, such as VCs,121 tend 
to prefer to register on the Nasdaq.122 
As a rough estimate for some of the costs borne by 
shareholders and indirectly caused by Rule 144, one can look at the 
excessive costs incurred as a result of trading on the Nasdaq rather 
than trading on the NYSE.  The aggregate cost inflicted by Rule 
144’s restrictions is at least as high as the cost of the measures taken 
by the shareholders in order to avoid the restrictions of the Rule. 
Huang and Stoll calculated the excessive cost of transacting on 
 
 116. See Wan, supra note 26, at 39; see also Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 9 
(“The IPO listing decision is strongly related to subsequent Rule 144 selling 
activity.”). 
 117. See Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 13 (“Many firms that are eligible for 
listing on the NYSE choose, instead, to have their shares traded on Nasdaq.”). 
 118. On the Nasdaq, dealers often take position (buy/sell) as opposed to 
merely acting as an agent who matches and completes the transaction.  The result 
is a doubling of the reported volume for a similar transaction.  See Wan, supra note 
26, at 14; Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 4. 
 119. See Wan, supra note 26, at 8 (“[C]ompanies usually perceive listing on the 
NYSE is prestigious and can enhance their firm visibility.”); Anderson et al., supra 
note 26, at 2 (“Numerous studies suggest that firms benefit from being listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).”). 
 120. See Wan, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he bid-ask spread for Nasdaq-listed 
stocks is larger than comparable NYSE-listed stocks.  This implies that stocks of 
companies that . . . list on the Nasdaq bear larger transaction costs . . . .”). 
 121. See Anderson et al., supra note 26, at 11 (“[T]he presence of venture 
capital backing of the IPO firm significantly increases both the number of sellers 
of restricted shares and the amount of such selling after the IPO.”). 
 122. Id. at 9 (“IPO firms that choose to list on the NYSE have significantly 
fewer insiders disposing of restricted shares in the two years following the IPO, 
and insiders in NYSE IPOs sell significantly fewer restricted shares overall.”). 
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the Nasdaq rather than on the NYSE in 1991.123  They found a 
difference of 10.8 cents per share in the “effective” bid-ask 
spreads.124  This number can be used as a conservative measure125 
for the calculation of the higher costs that investors chose to incur 
in order to circumvent some of the restrictions of Rule 144.  The 
corresponding average monthly trading volume per company 
traded on the Nasdaq is 3,681,500 shares, as calculated by Huang 
and Stoll, using a sample comprised of the largest Nasdaq stock 
matched to NYSE stock.126  Multiplying the difference in the 
effective spreads by an estimate of the yearly volume of trading of a 
hypothetical company traded on the Nasdaq127 results in a yearly 
estimated total loss of about $5 million.  Capitalizing the excessive 
yearly costs over the entire life of the firm, assuming no future 
switch to the competing exchange and no change in the difference 
between the exchanges, provides the estimated lifetime loss by the 
shareholders of a company traded on the Nasdaq, rather than on 
the NYSE, to be about $60 million.128 
While this shows another important inefficient behavior that is 
a direct result of Rule 144, it must be noted that this result can be 
fixed in a relatively easy manner.  To fix this specific distortion, it is 
enough that the method by which the volume of trading is 
measured for the calculation required by Rule 144 will be regulated 
so that the choice of stock exchange will no longer affect the 
selling rights under the Rule, and this does not call for abolishing 
the restriction altogether.  But this empirical result shows the 
extent to which shareholders will go to avoid Rule 144’s restrictions 
and indicates the significance of the sale restrictions and the need 
to consider the other distortions that it may cause. 
 
 123. See Roger D. Huang & Hans R. Stoll, Dealer Versus Auction Markets: A Paired 
Comparison of Execution Costs on NASDAQ and the NYSE, 41 J. FIN. ECON. 313 (1996). 
 124. Id. at 325.  “The cost of executing transactions is higher on Nasdaq than 
on the NYSE by every measure we calculate.”  Id. at 351.  “The contrast between 
the two markets is quite striking.  In each trade size category, the quoted spread 
on Nasdaq is nearly twice the quoted spread on the NYSE.”  Id. at 324. 
 125. Id. at 324–25. 
 126. Id. Table 1 at 321. 
 127. (10.8 ÷ 100) × $3,681,500 × 12 = $4,771,224. 
 128. ($4,771,224 ÷ 0.0814) = $58,614,545.  The 8.14 discount rate used for the 
capitalization is the long term interest rate in effect at the date of the data used for 
the empirical findings.  Huang & Stoll, supra note 123.  The rate used is the 1991 
thirty-year treasury constant maturity rate as reported by the Federal Reserve; these 
rates are available on the Federal Reserve website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/h15/data/Annual/H15_TCMNOM_Y30.txt. 
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IV.   TOWARD A MARKET FORCES DRIVEN REGIME 
This Part discusses the possibility of replacing the restrictions 
of Rule 144 with a market forces driven regime in which each 
company can decide whether to restrict the re-sale of pre-IPO 
acquired shares and the extent of such sale restriction.  Such a 
regime would be more efficient and would eliminate the distortions 
that are caused by the restrictions of Rule 144.  This Part further 
considers the possibility that a policy prohibiting any restriction on 
re-sales serves the interests of the public. 
Currently, underwriters contractually prevent sales by 
shareholders who purchased their shares prior to the IPO usually 
for a period of 180 days following the IPO.129  This contractual 
mechanism, aimed at stabilizing the market, is known as 
underwriters’ lock-up.  At the time of their investment, investors 
undertake to be bound by such lock-ups, should the underwriters 
deem it advisable for the success of the company’s IPO. 
The one-year holding period of Rule 144 might restrict sales 
for a longer time after the IPO than the customary 180-day lock-up 
period beginning at the IPO and administered by underwriters.  
Since Rule 144’s holding period starts from the original purchase 
date, the selling restriction following the IPO depends on how 
much time has lapsed between the original purchase date of the 
shares and the IPO.  The holding-period restriction of Rule 144 
might be unnecessary or even inefficient for the purpose of 
stabilizing the market because it may restrict sales after the IPO for 
longer than the 180 days of the underwriters’ lock-ups.130  If a 
longer period of sale restriction is needed in order to stabilize the 
market for the company’s shares, an efficient market will 
contractually administer such longer restriction because 
underwriters would have demanded it as part of their attempt to 
stabilize the market to ensure the success of the public registration 
of the company’s shares.  If an economic justification to restrict the 
 
 129. See SEC, supra note 96. 
 130. The time period of at least one year seems inconsistent and excessive in 
comparison with the mere six-month period of Section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 that fends off abuse of inside information in short-swing 
transactions.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (2000 & 
Supp. 2004).  Both of these periods—the six months of Section 16 and the one 
year of Rule 144—may be arbitrary.  A six-month period, however, seems to have a 
market validation as an efficient period for stabilizing the market and preventing 
insiders from trading because it is the customary period contractually enforced by 
underwriters as a lock-up period. 
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sale of shares following the initial public offering existed, as the 
one stated in the SEC’s preliminary note to Rule 144,131 such 
restrictions would have been contractually agreed upon and 
enforced, driven by market forces similar to those behind the 
administration of the underwriters’ lock-up. 
Moreover, contractual restrictions have the advantage of being 
specifically tailored to fit the different needs of each company.  
Each company may require a different restriction in order to create 
and stabilize a public market for its shares.  Such a restriction 
should be more flexible and take into account, inter alia, each 
company’s specific capital structure, size, and various accounting, 
business, and reputational characteristics.  For example, 
significantly promising companies may not need any sale 
restrictions in order to stabilize the market for their shares.  The 
shareholders of such companies should be allowed to resell their 
shares freely.  On the other hand, companies that are more 
susceptible to price fluctuations can restrict their shareholders 
contractually, similarly to the underwriters’ lock-ups.  Unlike the 
Rule 144 selling-volume restriction, the contractually administrated 
restrictions on resales will be sensitive to the number of restricted 
shares and the total effect of such sales.  The company-
administrated resale rights can also discriminate shareholders 
based on the importance each shareholder assigns to liquidity, and 
the company can grant the re-sale rights efficiently, based on the 
price each shareholder is willing to pay for liquidity. 
A company-initiated lock-up, such as the underwriters’ lock-
ups, is likely to be more efficient than Rule 144’s restrictions, as 
previously explained.  It may be, however, that a market free of any 
temporary artificial limitations on the supply of shares is preferable.  
Indeed, the administration of a lock-up period following an IPO is 
a deeply rooted custom in the going-public practice.  The fact that 
it is the underwriters’ custom, by itself, however, cannot provide a 
justification for its existence.  Other underwriters’ practices, such as 
the custom of under-pricing the offer of “hot” IPOs for the benefit 
of selected friends who are granted privileged access to lucrative 
public placements, have been challenged and their legality 
questioned.132 
 
 131. Preliminary Note to Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2006). 
 132. See Matt Marshall, Opening Up the IPO to Smaller Investors: Concept Catching 
the Interest of Bay Area Tech Companies, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 22, 2003, at 1E 
(“Ritter, the University of Florida professor . . . says . . . there’s no good 
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The interaction between the two underwriters’ practices—the 
under-pricing practice, which is known as “spinning” or as “the 
friends of Frank,” and the lock-ups practice—may shed a different 
light on the use of the underwriters’ lock-ups.  The lock-ups may 
well be instrumental in enabling those who were granted privileged 
access to the underpriced IPOs to realize quick gains before more 
shares are entered into the market.  Thus, it seems that these 
underwriters’ lock-ups are, in fact, driven by private dealing. 
Furthermore, shareholders have an inherent interest in 
avoiding price reductions triggered by a sudden large increase in 
the supply of shares in the market that the shareholders themselves 
might cause.  The concern about lowering the price of the shares 
in the midst of a sale may lead to self-restraint.  Rational 
shareholders, such as the sophisticated VCs that purchase shares 
before the IPO, will therefore refrain from hastily flooding the 
market with substantial amounts of shares, even in the absence of 
any legal obligation. 
In addition, it is foreseeable and natural that some increase in 
the supply of the stock will occur following the IPO because old 
investors are likely to realize profits by liquidating some of their 
original investment, provided that there is no restriction at this 
time.  Since this is known at the time of the IPO, it should not 
cause a significant effect on the stock price later.  If the old 
investors wish to conduct extensive sales, in an amount not 
reasonably foreseen at the time of the IPO, the stock price should 
reflect such conduct to the full extent, in the same manner as it 
reflects any exogenous changes in the share supply.  Artificially 
delaying such sales, either by Rule 144 or by using underwriters’ 
lock-ups, however, does not seem to benefit the public, but rather 
conceals important information from the public.  Thus, if the 
underwriters’ lock-ups are, in fact, driven by private dealing, and 
efficiency requires that there will be no such contractual 
restriction, Rule 144, which adds sale restrictions, is highly 
inefficient and may serve questionable practices such as the IPO 
under-pricing to the public’s detriment. 
 
explanation for underpricing 15 percent or more in a fair system . . . . All local 
tech IPOs this year have enjoyed first-day jumps of 25 percent or more.”); Andrew 
Ross Sorkin, Banker’s Trial Gives Glimpse into Close Ties of Tech Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
13, 2003, at C1 (“[B]ankers often tried to attract new business by offering 
corporate executives access to hot initial public offerings . . . .”). 
35
Ganor: Improving the Legal Environment for Startup Financing by Rational
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
6. GANOR - RC.DOC 4/22/2007  7:14:52 PM 
1482 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:4 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rule 144, in its current form, is inefficient and has distorting 
effects on the stock market and on the economy.  Its negative 
effects especially concern emerging ventures.  Both the selling-
volume restriction and the holding-period restriction of Rule 144 
impose a significant burden on companies.  An increase in the cost 
of raising capital and an incentive to invest in suboptimal levels are 
two of the main problems caused by Rule 144’s restrictions. 
In addition, the selling-volume restriction and the holding-
period restriction fail to properly address the concerns that are at 
the basis of Rule 144’s promulgation.  The restrictions might even 
cause the purchasing public to be less informed.  Furthermore, the 
restrictions do not effectively govern the trading volume increase, 
and their contribution to market stabilization is limited at best.  
Thus, I propose abolishing the main restrictions of Rule 144 and 
allowing market forces to reach an efficient mechanism. 
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